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Compensation for the Cost of a Surrogacy 
Arrangement in Personal Injury Cases 
SIRKO HARDER* 
 
A woman who has been rendered infertile by a defendant’s 
wrong may wish to obtain damages for the cost of becoming a 
parent through a surrogacy arrangement. Such a claim, which 
has yet to be brought before an Australian court, would raise two 
partially overlapping issues under Australian law. First, the 
claim must satisfy the general requirement that a person who has 
suffered personal injury can only recover expenses that are 
necessary and reasonable. Secondly, the laws of the Australian 
jurisdictions except the Northern Territory regulate surrogacy 
arrangements and criminalise commercial surrogacy 
arrangements (where the surrogate mother is promised a fee in 
addition to the reimbursement of expenses). This regulation may 
impact upon the recoverability of the cost of a surrogacy 
arrangement through the concepts of coherence of the law and 
public policy. The most complex scenario, but also the most 
likely to arise in Australian personal injury litigation, is that of a 
plaintiff who lives in Australia and wishes to enter into a 
commercial surrogacy arrangement in a foreign country in 
which this is lawful. This article investigates the legal issues that 
may arise if a claim for the cost of a surrogacy arrangement is 
brought before an Australian court. 
I Introduction 
A person suffering wrongfully inflicted personal injury is generally 
entitled to damages for (among others) the cost of medical treatment 
and rehabilitation.1 A person who has been rendered infertile by the 
injury and had previously intended to have a child or children may wish 
to obtain damages for the cost of assisted reproduction treatment. 2 
 
*  School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex. The author thanks the 
anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
1  See, eg, Ziliotto v Hakim [2013] NSWCA 359, [81]-[107]. 
2  The Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority identifies the following types of 
assisted reproductive treatment: ovulation induction, artificial insemination, donor 
conception, in-vitro fertilisation, gamete intrafallopian transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection, preimplantation genetic testing and surrogacy: Victorian Assisted Reproductive 
Treatment Authority, ‘Types of Treatment’, Fertility Treatment (Website, 19 October 2020) 
<https://www.varta.org.au/information-support/assisted-reproductive-treatment/types-
assisted-reproductive-treatment>. 
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There have been cases in which a male plaintiff who had wrongfully 
been rendered paraplegic or tetraplegic obtained damages for the cost 
of a fertility program that was necessary to achieve the pregnancy of his 
partner by using his sperm.3 
A woman who has been rendered infertile by the wrong4 of another 
person may seek to obtain damages for the cost of becoming a parent 
through a surrogacy arrangement. This is an arrangement in which, 
before the child is conceived, the intended parents and the surrogate 
mother (and her partner if she has one) agree that the surrogate mother 
will become pregnant with the intention that the child will, at birth, be 
handed over to the intended parents to be raised as their own. Under 
such an arrangement, the intended parents usually promise to make a 
payment to the surrogate mother. They may merely promise to 
reimburse the surrogate mother for the reasonable expenses she incurs 
in the pursuance of the surrogacy arrangement (altruistic surrogacy 
arrangement), or they may promise to reimburse those expenses and 
pay an additional amount (commercial surrogacy arrangement).5 
A claim for damages for the cost of a surrogacy arrangement has yet 
to be brought before an Australian court. Such a claim would raise two 
broad issues under Australian law. First, a person who has suffered 
personal injury can only recover expenses that are necessary and 
reasonable. 6  A claim for the cost of a surrogacy arrangement must 
therefore be rejected unless the arrangement can in principle be 
regarded as a reasonable method of addressing wrongfully inflicted 
infertility and, if so, the particular surrogacy arrangement intended by 
the plaintiff is reasonable in her individual circumstances.7 
Secondly, surrogacy is subject to detailed regulation in Australia 
except in the Northern Territory.8 The intended parents may become the 
legal parents of the child (other than through adoption) only in cases of 
 
3  Scarf v State of Queensland [1998] QSC 233, [171]-[176]; Dallas v P & M Denton Building 
Constructions Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 833, [94]; Mato v Zarkas [2005] NSWSC 800, [42]; 
Potts v Frost (2011) 59 MVR 267, 321-2 [254]-[255]. See also Denton v Transport Accident 
Commission (2000) 2 VR 374 (cost of fertility program is to be compensated under no-fault 
scheme); XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2020] 2 WLR 972, 986 [44]. 
4  In particular medical malpractice (see, eg, Namala v Northern Territory of Australia (1996) 
131 FLR 468), a motor accident (see, eg, Bulpitt v Gough (Supreme Court of South 
Australia, Full Court, Matheson, Olsson and Duggan JJ, 28 March 1991)) or the supply of a 
defective product (see the plaintiffs’ allegations in Moylan v Nutrasweet Co [2000] NSWCA 
337). 
5  The terminology adopted in this article (‘altruistic’, ‘commercial’, ‘intended parents’, 
‘surrogate mother’) is widely used in the literature and in Australian legislation. 
6  Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, 573; State Rail Authority of NSW v Brown (2006) 
66 NSWLR 540, [84]-[85]; Potts v Frost (2012) 22 Tas R 103, [118]. 
7  A surrogacy arrangement should not be regarded as reasonable unless it is carried out in a 
jurisdiction in which the interests of all parties are properly safeguarded: see, for English 
law, XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2020] 2 WLR 972, 988 [53]. 
8  The key features of the regulation will be referred to throughout this article. For an 
overview, see Tammy Johnson, ‘Through the Looking-Glass: A Proposal for National 
Reform of Australia’s Surrogacy Legislation’ in Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds), 
Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (Routledge, 2016) 31, 34-42, 60-3. 
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domestic altruistic surrogacy.9 At least in domestic cases, a promise by 
the intended parents to make a payment beyond the reimbursement of 
expenses is unenforceable and participation in commercial surrogacy is 
a criminal offence. The details differ between jurisdictions. 
The two broad issues overlap in parts. Whether it is reasonable for a 
plaintiff to enter into a particular type of surrogacy arrangement will in 
part depend upon the way it is regulated. But it will also depend on other 
factors, for example the availability of a cheaper option to address the 
consequences of infertility. Conversely, the regulation of a particular 
type of surrogacy arrangement may impact upon the availability of 
damages for its cost not only through the requirement of reasonableness 
but also through the concepts of coherence of the law and public policy. 
This article explores these issues. 10  It assumes that the place of 
litigation (the forum) is an Australian jurisdiction and that the law of 
the forum or of another Australian jurisdiction governs the defendant’s 
liability under the forum’s choice of law rules.11 The jurisdiction whose 
law governs liability will be called the locus delicti and its law the lex 
loci delicti.12 All types of surrogacy arrangement are discussed, but 
particular attention is given to the most common scenario, which is that 
of Australian residents entering into a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement in a foreign country in which this is lawful. 13  Views 
expressed by the Supreme Court of the UK in XX v Whittington 
Hospital NHS Trust14 in relation to English law will be considered in 
the relevant context. 
 
9  In this article, a surrogacy arrangement carried out in Australia is referred to as a domestic 
case, and a surrogacy arrangement carried out in another country is referred to as an 
international case. 
10  It does not discuss the merits of the regulation of surrogacy in Australia, on which there is a 
vast amount of literature; see, eg, Tammy Johnson (n 8) 31; Ronli Sifris, Karinne Ludlow 
and Adiva Sifris, ‘Commercial Surrogacy: What Role for Law in Australia?’ (2015) 23(2) 
Journal of Law and Medicine 275; Ronli Sifris, ‘Surrogacy’ in Ian Freckelton and Kerry 
Petersen (eds), Tensions and Traumas in Health Law (Federation Press 2017) 333. 
11  Under the choice-of-law rules of the Australian common law, liability in tort is governed by 
the law of the place of the tort (lex loci delicti): John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 
CLR 503; Regie National Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491. In cases of 
negligence or trespass, the place of the tort is usually the place where the defendant acted or 
should have acted: Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, 606 [43]. 
See also Martin Davies et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis, 10th ed, 
2020) [20.1]-[20.12]. 
12  This terminology is chosen because the claim is more likely to be brought in tort. If the 
claim is brought in contract, the locus delicti represents the jurisdiction whose law governs 
the contract in question. It is still assumed that this jurisdiction is the forum or another 
Australian jurisdiction. 
13  For a comparison of the surrogacy laws of various countries including Australia, see Claire 
Fenton-Glynn and Jens M Scherpe, ‘Surrogacy in a Globalised World: Comparative 
Analysis and Thoughts on Regulation’ in Jens M Scherpe, Claire Fenton-Glynn and Terry 
Kaan (eds), Eastern and Western Perspectives on Surrogacy (Intersentia, 2019) 515; 
Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont, ‘General Report on Surrogacy’ in Katarina 
Trimmings and Paul Beaumont (eds), International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal 
Regulation at the International Level (Hart, 2013) 439. 
14  XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2020] 2 WLR 972 (‘XX v Whittington Hospital’). 
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Parts II-V consider possible objections to compensation for the cost 
of some or all types of surrogacy arrangement. Part V considers the 
denial of compensation by direct resort to public policy. Parts II-IV 
consider other principles, such as the requirement of reasonableness, 
although some of those principles may in turn be based upon, or 
informed by, public policy. Part VI considers some issues that may arise 
in cases in which the cost of a surrogacy arrangement can in principle 
be recovered. It is assumed throughout that the surrogacy arrangement 
has yet to occur. However, the rules on the recoverability of the cost of 
a surrogacy arrangement will be the same where the arrangement has 
already occurred, except that the issue of uncertainty discussed in Part 
VI(C) cannot then arise. 
II Objections to Compensation that Relate to Parentage 
A. The Plaintiff M ust be a G enetic Parent of the Child 
It might be argued that a measure designed to address the consequences 
of the plaintiff’s inability to bear a child herself can be necessary and 
reasonable only if it leads to the birth of a child that is genetically the 
plaintiff’s child. This would exclude recovery for the cost of a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement (where the surrogate mother is the 
genetic mother of the child) or of a gestational surrogacy arrangement 
that involves the use of donor eggs. 
The argument must be rejected. While a genetic relationship may 
have been crucial to the concept of family in the past, it is not a 
prerequisite today. Adoption and step-parenting are socially accepted 
and not uncommon, and the emotional relationship between adoptive 
parent and adoptive child and between step-parent and step-child is 
often the same as in the case of genetic parentage. In the case of 
surrogacy, where the intended parents initiate the pregnancy and obtain 
the child soon after the birth, they usually have the same emotional 
connection with the child as if one of them had carried the child, even 
if neither of them is a genetic parent of the child.15 The pleasure of 
bringing up children as one’s own may be a more important benefit of 
having children than the wish to perpetuate one’s genes.16 
B. The Plaintiff M ust be a Legal Parent of the Child 
It might be argued that a measure designed to remedy the loss of the 
opportunity to become the legal parent of a child (through bearing and 
 
15  XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2019] 3 WLR 107, 135 [103] (King LJ); XX v 
Whittington Hospital (n 14) 987 [48]. The claim is supported by empirical studies: see, eg, 
Susan Golombok, Modern Families: Parents and Children in New Family Forms 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015) chapter 5 (review of UK study). 
16  XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14) 987 [47]. 
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giving birth to the child) can be necessary and reasonable only if the 
measure results in the plaintiff becoming the legal parent of a child. It 
might thus be argued that the cost of a surrogacy arrangement cannot 
be recovered unless the plaintiff will be a legal parent of the child born 
under the arrangement.17 
If accepted, this argument would significantly restrict the 
availability of compensation for the cost of a surrogacy arrangement. 
Leaving aside adoption, which may be possible even in cases of 
international commercial surrogacy,18 Australian residents are unlikely 
to be recognised as the legal parents of a child born through a surrogacy 
arrangement except in cases of domestic altruistic surrogacy.19 
However, the plaintiff’s ability to become a legal parent of the child 
should not be a prerequisite for the recovery of the cost of a surrogacy 
arrangement. The loss suffered by the plaintiff because of infertility is 
not so much the inability to obtain a particular legal status but the 
inability to experience the joy and sense of fulfilment and responsibility 
that may be derived from raising a child. A surrogacy arrangement can 
remedy that loss.20 
Intended parents are able to take custody of the child even though 
they are not the child’s legal parents at birth. Where the child was born 
overseas, intended parents who live in Australia are able to bring the 
child into Australia, as genetic parenthood of one of the intended 
parents and consent by the surrogate mother (and her partner) are 
usually sufficient for the child to obtain Australian citizenship or a 
permanent visa.21 Intended parents may obtain a parental responsibility 
order from an Australian court, 22  even in cases of international 
commercial surrogacy.23 The court may order, for example, that the 
child live with the intended parents and that they have equal shared 
responsibility for making decisions about day-to-day issues and long-
term issues relating to the child.24 The remaining differences to the 
status of a legal parent should not render a surrogacy arrangement an 
 
17  Such an argument is made for English law by Rob Weir, ‘Surrogacy; Simply Claim What’s 
Reasonable; Analysing XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust’ [2020] 3 Journal of Personal 
Injury Law 182, 185. 
18  See W: Re Adoption (1998) 23 Fam LR 538. 
19  See below, Part V(A) and (B). For a detailed analysis and criticism of the law: see Alexandra 
Harland and Cressida Limon, ‘Recognition of Parentage in Surrogacy Arrangements in 
Australia’ in Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights 
(Routledge, 2016) 145. 
20  See above (n 15) and accompanying text. 
21  See the advice by the Department of Home Affairs at ‘International Surrogacy 
Arrangements’ (Webpage, 19 October 2020), 
<https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/citizenship/become-a-citizen/by-descent/international-
surrogacy-arrangements>. 
22  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65C(c). 
23  See, eg, Hubert v Juntasa [2011] FamCA 504; Johnson v Chompunut [2011] FamCA 505; 
Hian and Jang [2020] FamCA 171. 
24  See, eg, Hubert v Juntasa [2011] FamCA 504; Johnson v Chompunut [2011] FamCA 505. 
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unnecessary or unreasonable method of addressing the effects of 
infertility.25 
III No Compensable Loss Where the Surrogacy Agreement 
is Unenforceable 
It might be argued that the enforceability of the surrogacy agreement is 
a prerequisite for the recoverability of its cost from the defendant. An 
argument to this effect can be made in two different ways. First, it might 
be argued that the plaintiff’s entry into a surrogacy agreement does not 
lead to her suffering any loss except to the extent (if any) to which the 
surrogate mother has an enforceable claim against the plaintiff. 
Secondly, it might be argued that it would be incoherent for a legal 
system to regard a particular type of surrogacy agreement as 
unenforceable and yet to regard the cost of entering into such an 
agreement as recoverable loss. The first argument asserts the factual 
absence of loss; the second argument asserts the normative absence of 
compensable loss. The two arguments will be discussed separately. 
A. The F actual Absence of Loss 
It might be argued that the defendant cannot be legally liable to the 
plaintiff beyond the amount (if any) in which the plaintiff is legally 
liable to the surrogate mother (or the organisation that provides the 
surrogate mother). This argument is not one of public policy or 
coherence of the law, but simply the argument that there is no loss to be 
compensated except to the extent to which the surrogate mother has an 
enforceable claim against the plaintiff. 
If this argument were accepted, the determination of the defendant’s 
liability would require the court to determine the amount (if any) that 
the surrogate mother would most likely be able to compel (through a 
judicial process) the plaintiff to pay. This will depend on the rules 
(including the choice-of-law rules) for surrogacy agreements of the 
jurisdiction in which the surrogate mother would most likely bring the 
action, and if the plaintiff lives in a different jurisdiction, it will depend 
on whether that jurisdiction would enforce a foreign judgment obtained 
by the surrogate mother. Thus, if the plaintiff lives in a foreign 
jurisdiction whose law refuses to enforce any surrogacy agreement 
(even if altruistic), the surrogate mother (who lives in a different 
jurisdiction) may be unable to compel the plaintiff to pay anything and 
nothing could be recovered from the defendant. 
There are two reasons for rejecting the argument under discussion. 
First, even if the plaintiff is not under a legal obligation to keep the 
 
25  A separate question is whether the law’s denial of legal parentage indicates a public policy 
against the compensation of the cost of a surrogacy arrangement. Public policy is discussed 
below Part V. 
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promise she has made to the surrogate mother, the plaintiff will be under 
a moral obligation to do so. 26  A moral obligation to pay may be 
sufficient for the recoverability of that amount from the defendant under 
the Australian common law.27 Secondly, if the defendant’s liability is 
made dependent upon the factual ability of the surrogate mother to force 
the plaintiff to pay, all avenues open to the surrogate mother must be 
considered, not just a legal action. At least a part, and perhaps the 
whole, of the amount promised by the plaintiff will be due before the 
birth of the child. Thus, the plaintiff will have no choice but to make the 
promised payment, whether or not there is a legal obligation to do so, 
lest the pregnancy be terminated or the child withheld. 
B. The N ormative Absence of Compensable Loss 
It might be argued that the cost of entering into a surrogacy agreement 
should not be regarded as compensable loss where the agreement is 
unenforceable. This argument does not deny that the plaintiff may well 
end up making a payment to the surrogate mother, but rejects the 
recoverability of any such expense by reference to the concept of 
coherence of the law, which the courts regard as being central in 
Australian law.28 The argument asserts that it would be incoherent for 
the lex loci delicti to refuse to enforce a particular surrogacy agreement 
and yet to require a defendant to pay for the plaintiff’s cost of entering 
into that agreement. 29  In order to determine the relevance of that 
argument to an Australian locus delicti, it is necessary to consider 
briefly the rules of the Australian jurisdictions on the enforceability of 
surrogacy arrangements, including the choice-of-law rules and the rules 
on the recognition of foreign judgments. 
1 The Enforceability of Surrogacy Agreements in Australia 
At common law, which applies in the Northern Territory, a promise by 
the intended parents to pay a fee in addition to the reimbursement of 
expenses is probably unenforceable. 30  All other jurisdictions have 
 
26  Many intended parents regard the lack of payment to the surrogate mother as morally 
questionable: see Emily Jackson et al, ‘Learning from Cross-Border Reproduction’ (2017) 
25(1) Medical Law Review 23, 28-31. 
27  Blundell v Musgrave (1956) 96 CLR 73, 79 (Dixon CJ). 
28  CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390, 406-10 [39]-
[42]; Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15]; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 
246 CLR 498, 513 [23], 518 [34]. The rules of the locus delicti on the enforceability of 
surrogacy arrangements may also inform the public policy of the locus delicti in relation to 
the recoverability of the cost of a surrogacy arrangement. Public policy will be discussed 
below Part V. 
29  A surrogacy agreement is not being enforced simply by awarding damages for its cost: Weir 
(n 17) 187. 
30  See A v C (1978) 8 Fam Law 170, [1985] Fam LR 445; Mary Keyes, ‘Australia’ in Katarina 
Trimmings and Paul Beaumont (eds), International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal 
Regulation at the International Level (Hart, 2013) 25, 38. 
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legislation providing that any surrogacy agreement is unenforceable 
except that the intended parents’ promise to reimburse the surrogate 
mother for particular expenses can be enforced unless the surrogate 
mother decides to keep the child.31 The statutes differ as to the items of 
expenditure that are expressly listed as being recoverable. 
The statutes are silent as to the law that governs a cross-border 
surrogacy agreement. Australian courts can approach this issue in one 
of two ways. 32  One possibility is to regard the Australian rules as 
internationally mandatory and apply them to every surrogacy 
agreement before an Australian court. But this could lead to the 
application of the Australian law to a surrogacy agreement that has no 
connection with Australia (other than that it happens to be litigated in 
Australia). It is preferable for the courts to undertake a choice-of-law 
exercise and determine the proper law of the surrogacy agreement. The 
proper law of a contract is generally the legal system expressly or 
impliedly chosen by the parties or, where there is no choice or the 
choice is not valid, the legal system with which the contract has its 
closest and most real connection.33 
It is not necessary to discuss how the closest connection of a 
surrogacy agreement ought to be determined and whether the parties 
ought to be permitted to choose a different law. But it needs to be 
discussed whether a court in the locus delicti is likely to enforce the 
intended parents’ promise to pay a fee (in addition to reimbursing 
expenses) whenever that promise is enforceable under the foreign 
proper law of the surrogacy agreement. An Australian court can refuse 
to apply a particular foreign law where such an application would 
violate the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.34 Public policy 
relates to fundamental values and is not violated simply because the 
foreign rules differ from the internal rules of the forum.35 
There should be no public policy concern where the difference 
between the lex loci delicti and the foreign law relates merely to the 
 
31  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 6; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 15; Surrogacy Act 2019 (SA) 
ss 9-13; Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 10; Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 
44(3); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 7. Even though s 31 of the Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) 
provides that a surrogacy agreement ‘has no legal effect’ other than that it may form the 
basis of a parentage order, the intended parents’ promise to reimburse the surrogate mother 
for her reasonable expenses should be enforceable: see Mary Keyes, ‘Cross-Border 
Surrogacy Agreements’ (2012) 26(1) Australian Journal of Family Law 28, 38-9. 
32  See Mary Keyes, ‘Cross-Border Surrogacy Agreements’ (2012) 26(1) Australian Journal of 
Family Law 28, 38 (preferring the choice-of-law approach). 
33  Bonython v Commonwealth (1950) 81 CLR 486, 498 (PC); Oceanic Sun Line Special 
Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197, 217, 224, 259-60; Akai Pty Ltd v People’s 
Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418, 441-2; Ship Sam Hawk v Reiter Petroleum Inc 
(2016) 246 FCR 337, 400 [256], [258]. 
34  Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30, 49-
50 (Brennan J). 
35  See, in the context of the recognition of foreign judgments, LFDB v SM (2017) 256 FCR 
218, [43]; Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd (2017) 323 FLR 95, 100-1 [15]-[18]. 
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items of expenditure in relation to which a promise of the intended 
parents of reimbursement is enforceable. The surrogacy agreement is 
still altruistic, and the Australian jurisdictions are not in principle averse 
to altruistic surrogacy agreements. 
A foreign law that considers a promise to pay a fee (in addition to 
reimbursing expenses) enforceable is more problematic. The laws of all 
Australian jurisdictions regard such a promise as unenforceable. They 
do so in order to prevent the commodification of children and the 
exploitation of vulnerable women. Arguably, these interests are 
sufficiently fundamental to be part of the public policy for choice-of-
law purposes. However, the enforcement of an agreement governed by 
foreign law should not be refused on public policy grounds unless 
performance of the agreement affects the forum.36 The performance of 
a surrogacy agreement affects Australia only if the fertilisation 
procedure is carried out here or the surrogate mother lives here during 
her pregnancy or the child is intended to live here. 
The distinctions made for the question of when an Australian court 
may refuse to apply a foreign law on grounds of public policy should 
also be made for the question of when Australian law may invoke public 
policy to refuse to recognise a foreign judgment in favour of the 
surrogate mother.37 
2 Coherence of the Law 
It must now be discussed whether it would be incoherent for the lex loci 
delicti to regard the cost of entering into a surrogacy agreement as 
compensable to the extent to which a court in the locus delicti would 
refuse to enforce the agreement, or to recognise a foreign judgment 
enforcing the agreement, in accordance with the rules discussed in the 
previous section. This question is most relevant in practice where the 
plaintiff lives in Australia and intends to enter into a commercial 
surrogacy agreement, in which case a court in the locus delicti would 
refuse to enforce the plaintiff’s promise of a fee (in addition to 
reimbursing expenses) or would refuse to recognise a foreign judgment 
enforcing that promise. 
Coherence of the law requires at least that ‘[r]ules that belong to the 
same legal system must not prescribe different outcomes in relation to 
the same set of facts’.38 Coherence in this basic sense is present in the 
circumstances under discussion. The rule ‘the surrogate mother cannot 
enforce the plaintiff’s promise of a fee’ and the rule ‘the fee promised 
by the plaintiff is compensable loss’ do not prescribe different outcomes 
 
36  Martin Davies, Andrew Bell, Paul Le Gay Brereton and Michael Douglas, Nygh’s Conflict 
of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis, 10th ed, 2020) [18.42]. 
37  See above n 35. 
38  Ross Grantham and Darryn Jensen, ‘Coherence in the Age of Statutes’ (2016) 42(2) Monash 
University Law Review 360, 363. 
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in relation to the same set of facts. One rule applies to the relationship 
between the surrogate mother and the plaintiff and the other rule applies 
to the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The two 
relationships are independent of each other.39 
Where, as in the present context,40 the effect of particular statutory 
provisions on the common law is at issue, coherence of the law might 
be said to require the common law to give effect to the purpose of the 
statute. The High Court expressed this view in Miller v Miller 
(‘Miller’).41 A car stolen by the plaintiff and the defendant was driven 
by the defendant with the plaintiff as a passenger. The defendant drove 
dangerously and struck a pole. The plaintiff suffered serious injuries. 
On the question of whether the defendant had owed the plaintiff a duty 
of care at common law, the High Court said that, if the plaintiff had been 
criminally liable for the defendant’s criminal offence of dangerous 
driving,42 the imposition of a duty of care on the defendant would not 
have been consistent with the purpose of the statute proscribing 
dangerous driving, the purpose being to deter and punish dangerous 
driving.43  
This particular notion of coherence probably leads to the denial of 
compensation for the cost of entering into a surrogacy agreement to the 
extent to which a court in the locus delicti would refuse to enforce the 
plaintiff’s promise to the surrogate mother. Awards of compensation 
for the cost of a commercial surrogacy arrangement would make the 
occurrence of such arrangements more likely. But the deterrence of 
commercial surrogacy arrangements must be one of the reasons why 
Australia’s surrogacy statutes declare the intended parents’ promise to 
pay a fee (beyond reimbursing expenses) unenforceable. Denying the 
intended parents’ promise enforceability is not necessary to ensure that 
they do not have the power to force the surrogate mother to manage her 
pregnancy in a particular way or to relinquish the child; denying the 
 
39  If it is argued that there is a link between the two relationships because there is no loss to be 
compensated except to the extent to which the plaintiff incurs a legal liability towards the 
surrogate mother, then this is not a normative argument but the assertion of a factual absence 
of loss. This argument is rejected above, Part III(A). 
40  Except in the Northern Territory, where the enforceability of a surrogacy agreement is 
governed by the common law. 
41  Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446 (‘Miller’). 
42  Pursuant to the Criminal Code (WA) s 8, the plaintiff’s participation in the joint criminal 
enterprise of stealing the car made her criminally liable for the dangerous driving as a 
probable consequence of the enterprise unless she withdrew from the enterprise before the 
dangerous driving. Since the plaintiff, prior to the crash, had asked twice to be let out of the 
car, the High Court (Heydon J dissenting) held that she had withdrawn from the joint 
criminal enterprise, and that the defendant owed her a duty of care from that point. 
43  See Miller (n 41), 480 [94], 481-2 [101]. 
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surrogate mother’s promise enforceability is sufficient for that 
purpose.44 
The High Court’s approach in Miller is problematic. Since different 
statutes pursue different, and sometimes conflicting purposes, it is not 
possible for the common law to give maximum effect to the purpose of 
every statute. As Andrew Fell argues, coherence of the law should be 
understood as consistency in the normative reasons or considerations 
on which different rules are based.45 The common law must respect the 
relative weight that the legislature has given to every reason for and 
against a statutory rule; beyond that, the statute is silent.46 Fell explains 
that whatever the reasons for and against imposing criminal liability for 
stealing and dangerous driving, they are unlikely to include reasons that 
favour or disfavour liability in negligence, and imposing liability in 
negligence is not inconsistent with the statute even if the purpose of the 
statute favours the opposite outcome.47 Applying Fell’s concept in the 
present context, whatever the reasons for or against the enforceability 
of a commercial surrogacy agreement, they are unlikely to include 
reasons that favour or disfavour the recognition of the intended 
mother’s cost as a loss compensable in actions for personal injury, and 
regarding the cost as compensable is not inconsistent with the statutory 
rule of unenforceability even if the purpose of that rule favours the 
opposite outcome.48 
Nevertheless, the concept of coherence of the law adopted by the 
High Court in Miller is likely to exclude compensation of the cost of a 
surrogacy arrangement to the extent to which a statute of the locus 
delicti proscribes the enforcement of the plaintiff’s promise to make a 
payment to the surrogate mother. It is thus likely to exclude 
compensation for the payment of a fee (beyond reimbursing expenses) 
except where the Northern Territory is the locus delicti or where the 
surrogacy arrangement has no connection with Australia. 
 
44  The key reason for the unenforceability of surrogacy agreements (except for the 
reimbursement of costs) is to ensure that the intended parents do not have the power to force 
the surrogate mother to manage her pregnancy in a particular way or to relinquish the child: 
Explanatory Notes, Surrogacy Bill 2009 (Qld) 4, citing Investigation into Altruistic 
Surrogacy Committee, Queensland Parliament, Report (2008) 71. See also Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption (Final Report, 
March 2007) 188-9. 
45  Andrew Fell, ‘The Concept of Coherence in Australian Private Law’ (2018) 41(3) 
Melbourne University Law Review 1160, 1174-9. The view that coherence of the law 
requires more than the absence of contradiction is also advanced by Grantham and Jensen, 
(n 38) 360. 
46  Fell (n 45) 1180, 1185. Fell gives the example of a statute that permits abortions for women 
born in odd years and prohibits it for women born in even years. This is incoherent. Since 
the applicable reasons (those favouring abortion and those disfavouring abortion) are the 
same for both sets of women, the relative weight given to each reason must also be the same. 
47  Fell (n 45) 1190. 
48  For similar reasons, it may not be incoherent for the common law to refuse to enforce a 
particular surrogacy agreement and yet to regard the cost of entering into such an agreement 
as compensable. 
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IV Objections to Compensation that are Based on the 
Criminal Law 
The cost of a surrogacy arrangement may not be recoverable where the 
participation in the type of surrogacy arrangement intended by the 
plaintiff constitutes a criminal offence under the lex loci delicti or 
perhaps some other law. 
Under Victorian law, it is a criminal offence for a surrogate mother 
to receive any material benefit or advantage other than reimbursement 
for the ‘prescribed costs’ actually incurred.49 Under the laws of the 
other Australian jurisdictions except the Northern Territory,50 the mere 
entering into a ‘commercial’ surrogacy agreement is a criminal 
offence. 51  A surrogacy agreement is ‘commercial’ if the intended 
parents promise to make a payment in addition to the reimbursement of 
the expenses that are permitted to be reimbursed. Since the laws of the 
jurisdictions differ slightly as to those expenses, they also differ slightly 
as to what surrogacy agreements are prohibited. For example, the 
reimbursement of lost income is permitted by the laws of the states,52 
but probably not by the law of the Australian Capital Territory.53 The 
criminal prohibitions of the Australian Capital Territory, New South 
Wales and Queensland have extraterritorial effect, as it is sufficient for 
their application that the offender is ordinarily resident in the 
jurisdiction.54 
 
49  Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 44. The ‘prescribed costs’ are set out in 
the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2019 (Vic) reg 11. 
50  Health care practitioners in the NT (as well as the rest of Australia) must not participate in 
commercial surrogacy arrangements as these are considered ethically unacceptable by the 
National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (2017) 65. 
51  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 8; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 56; Surrogacy Act 2019 (SA) s 
23; Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 40; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 8; Parentage Act 2004 
(ACT) s 41. For calls for decriminalisation of commercial surrogacy, see, eg, Kathleen 
Simmonds, ‘Reforming the Surrogacy Laws of Australia: Some Thoughts, Considerations 
and Alternatives’ (2009) 11(1) Flinders Journal of Law Reform 97; Anita Stuhmcke, ‘The 
Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy: The Wrong Answers to the Wrong Questions’ (2015) 
23(2) Journal of Law and Medicine 333. 
52  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 7(3)(e); Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 11(2)(f); Surrogacy Act 
2019 (SA) s 11(1)(b) (subject to regulations); Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 9(3)(f); Assisted 
Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2019 (Vic) reg 11(1)(e). Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 
6(3)(b). 
53  Section 40 of the Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) refers to ‘expenses’ connected with - shortly - a 
pregnancy or child. Lost income would not normally be regarded as ‘expenses’. 
54  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 45; Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 11; Surrogacy Act 2010 
(Qld) s 54(b). See Dudley v Chedi [2011] FamCA 502, [16], [44]; Findlay v Punyawong 
[2011] FamCA 503, [32]; Johnson v Chompunut [2011] FamCA 505, [13]. For a detailed 
analysis and criticism of the extraterritorial offences, see Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Extra-
Territoriality and Surrogacy: The Problem of State and Territory Moral Sovereignty’ in 
Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (Routledge, 
2016) 65. 
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Even though Australian residents regularly engage in international 
commercial surrogacy,55 no person has ever been prosecuted under the 
extraterritorial laws just mentioned.56 But this does not justify treating 
actions that are criminally prohibited as if they were permitted. The 
decision on whether a certain crime is prosecuted is based on the public 
interest in prosecution and the effective use of public resources. A 
decision not to prosecute Australian residents for engaging in 
international commercial surrogacy does not negate the legislature’s 
decision to criminally prohibit such conduct, and the legislature’s 
decision may still impact upon the recoverability of the cost of 
commercial surrogacy. 
The criminal laws of various jurisdictions may be relevant in 
different ways. It is necessary to distinguish between the case where the 
surrogacy arrangement proposed by the plaintiff contravenes the 
criminal law of any jurisdiction (actual criminality) and the case where 
the surrogacy arrangement proposed by the plaintiff does not 
contravene the criminal law of any jurisdiction but would, if carried out 
in the locus delicti, contravene the criminal law of the locus delicti 
(hypothetical criminality). 
A. Actual Criminality 
This category concerns a surrogacy arrangement the participation in 
which constitutes a criminal offence under the law of any jurisdiction. 
The clearest scenario is where the plaintiff’s participation in the 
surrogacy arrangement contemplated by her would render her 
criminally liable under the lex loci delicti. An example would be a 
plaintiff who is ordinarily resident in Queensland (the locus delicti) and 
is seeking compensation for the cost of entering into a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement with a surrogate mother living in California. 
Regardless of whether an award of compensation in those 
circumstances would render the lex loci delicti incoherent, 
compensation should be denied on the ground that an activity that 
renders the plaintiff criminally liable under the lex loci delicti is not a 
 
55  In 2016, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection estimated that it dealt with 
about 250 offshore surrogacy cases every year; see House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Surrogacy Matters: 
Inquiry into the Regulatory and Legislative Aspects of International and Domestic 
Surrogacy Arrangements (April 2016) [1.69]. However, some countries that Australians 
used to travel to for commercial surrogacy arrangements (India, Nepal and Thailand) have 
outlawed commercial surrogacy arrangements with foreigners; see Australian Human Rights 
Commission, Inquiry into the Regulatory and Legislative Aspects of Surrogacy 
Arrangements: Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social 
Policy and Legal Affairs (17 February 2016) [172]-[176]. 
56  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Surrogacy Matters: Inquiry into the Regulatory and Legislative 
Aspects of International and Domestic Surrogacy Arrangements (April 2016) [1.71]. 
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necessary and reasonable measure to address personal injury. 57  A 
defendant should not be required to fund criminal activity. 
The same principle should apply where the person incurring 
criminal liability under the lex loci delicti is someone other than the 
plaintiff. Even if it is only the surrogate mother who incurs criminal 
liability (as under Victorian law) or only the medical professionals 
involved in the fertilisation procedure, the cost of the surrogacy 
arrangement should not be regarded as a necessary and reasonable 
expense. 
The same principle should also apply where it is a legal system other 
than the lex loci delicti that criminalises participation in the surrogacy 
arrangement contemplated by the plaintiff.58 Consider again a plaintiff 
who is ordinarily resident in Queensland and is seeking compensation 
for the cost of entering into a commercial surrogacy arrangement with 
a surrogate mother living in California. Even if the locus delicti is an 
Australian jurisdiction other than Queensland, the plaintiff’s cost of 
entering into the surrogacy arrangement should not be regarded as a 
necessary and reasonable expense. 
In summary, the cost of a surrogacy arrangement that involves 
criminal conduct should not be regarded as a necessary and reasonable 
expense, whoever is the person that is criminally liable and whichever 
legal system imposes the criminal liability. 
B. H ypothetical Criminality under the Lex Loci D elicti 
The type of surrogacy arrangement now to be discussed has three 
features. First, it is intended to take place outside Australia. Secondly, 
no person will incur criminal liability under the law of any jurisdiction 
by participating in the surrogacy arrangement as intended. Thirdly, if 
the surrogacy arrangement were to take place in the locus delicti 
(everything else remaining the same), the plaintiff or someone else 
would be criminally liable under the lex loci delicti. An example would 
be a plaintiff who resides in Tasmania (the locus delicti) and intends to 
enter into a commercial surrogacy arrangement with a surrogate mother 
living in California. No person will incur criminal liability in these 
circumstances as the Tasmanian criminal prohibition does not have 
extraterritorial effect. But the plaintiff would be criminally liable under 
Tasmanian law if the same arrangement were to occur in Tasmania. 
In a different context, the impact of hypothetical criminality was 
considered in Waks v Cyprys.59 The plaintiff was sexually abused as a 
child by the defendant at a Melbourne college, as a result of which the 
 
57  See, for Canadian law, Wilhelmson v Dumma (2017) 96 BCLR (5th) 120, [374]. 
58  The same view seems to have been taken for English law in XX v Whittington Hospital (n 
14) 985 [40]. 
59  [2020] VSC 44. 
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plaintiff developed major depression and dependency on alcohol, 
marijuana and other drugs. He moved to Israel, where a medical 
practitioner in compliance with Israeli law prescribed medicinal 
cannabis for the plaintiff because it assisted him with his anxiety and 
sleeping issues. Forbes J in the Supreme Court of Victoria refused to 
include in the damages the cost of the past and of future prescription of 
medicinal cannabis in Israel, for two reasons. First, her Honour pointed 
to the absence of evidence that the prescription of medicinal cannabis 
in circumstances of polysubstance abuse is desirable, and said that 
absent such evidence she could not be satisfied that an award of 
damages would be reasonable.60 This was simply an application of the 
general principle that an expense must be necessary and reasonable in 
order to be recoverable. Secondly, Forbes J observed that Victorian law 
governed liability, and that there was no evidence that a medical 
practitioner in Victoria might be approved to prescribe medicinal 
cannabis in the plaintiff’s circumstances.61 
Forbes J in Waks v Cyprys thus expressed the view that the cost of 
a measure that addresses the effects of personal injury cannot be 
recovered where that measure would involve criminal activity if it were 
to take place in the locus delicti, even though the measure did, or is 
intended to, take place in a foreign country in which it is legal. Forbes 
J did not explain exactly why she considered the criminal law of the 
locus delicti relevant. 
Perhaps Her Honour was invoking the concept of coherence of the 
law. This concept was invoked by the minority of the UK Supreme 
Court in XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust. 62  Lord Carnwath 
(dissenting), with whom Lord Reed PSC agreed, said that the objective 
of coherence or consistency between the civil law and the criminal law 
of a legal system would not be achieved if the civil courts awarded 
damages on the basis of conduct which, if undertaken in that country, 
would offend its criminal law.63 This view is not convincing, however, 
whatever notion of coherence of the law is adopted. In order to assess 
whether the civil law and the criminal law of a legal system are 
consistent with each other, all rules need to be considered, including the 
rules on the territorial reach of the criminal law. The circumstances now 
under discussion involve hypothetical (as opposed to actual) criminality 
precisely because the conduct in question is beyond the territorial reach 
 
60  Ibid [135]. 
61  Ibid [136]. 
62  XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14).   
63  Ibid 992 [66]. Lord Carnwath proceeded on the premise that someone would have incurred 
criminal liability under English law if the plaintiff had entered into a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement in England rather than California. However, only third parties promoting 
surrogacy on a commercial basis can incur criminal liability under English law, not the 
intended parents or the surrogate mother: Surrogacy Arrangement Act 1985 (UK) s 2(2). 
Lord Carnwath must thus have assumed that such third parties would have been involved. 
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of the criminal law of the locus delicti. It is difficult to see why it should 
be incoherent if the civil law of a jurisdiction grants compensation for 
the cost of a measure that is not subject to the criminal law of that 
jurisdiction.64  
Therefore, hypothetical criminality under the lex loci delicti does not 
affect the recoverability of the cost of a surrogacy arrangement through 
the concept of coherence of the law. Whether it does so through the 
concept of public policy will be discussed in the next Part. 
V Public Policy as a Bar to Compensation 
Compensation for a head of loss may be denied on grounds of public 
policy. 65  What is meant here is not that the public policy of an 
Australian jurisdiction bars the application of the law of damages of a 
foreign country in a particular case, but that the public policy of an 
Australian jurisdiction informs the law of damages of the same 
jurisdiction. 
The relevant jurisdiction is the locus delicti. Where the forum is not 
the locus delicti, the forum’s public policy is irrelevant. Section 118 of 
the Australian Constitution prohibits the courts of one Australian 
jurisdiction from refusing to apply the law of another Australian 
jurisdiction on grounds of public policy.66 
The public policy of a legal system must be derived from the rules 
of law of that system. A legal system’s public policy in relation to 
surrogacy must be derived from the way in which surrogacy is 
regulated. The most important aspect is whether participation in a 
surrogacy arrangement is criminalised either for all or some types of 
surrogacy. Other relevant aspects are whether the intended parents are 
recognised as the legal parents of the child and whether the surrogate 
mother can enforce the intended parents’ promise of payment. The 
relevant rules of the Australian jurisdictions distinguish between 
altruistic and commercial surrogacy and between domestic and 
international surrogacy. It is therefore necessary to discuss the four 
categories separately. No distinction will be made between a surrogacy 
arrangement carried out in the locus delicti and a surrogacy 
arrangement carried out elsewhere in Australia. The public policy 
 
64  Anthony Searle and Anne Kavanagh, ‘Commercial Surrogacy: The Birth of a New Head of 
Loss in Clinical Negligence Claims’ [2019] (October) Family Law 1186, 1194-5; John Lucas 
M Taylor, ‘International Commercial Surrogacy as a New Head of Tortious Damage: XX v 
Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 2832’ (2020) 28(1) Medical Law 
Review 197, 205 (who argues that the denial of compensation would create incoherence 
within the civil law); Weir (n 17), 187. 
65  See, eg, Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529, 606 
(Murphy J); Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, 86-9 [236]-[242] (Hayne J). 
66  Merwin Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Moolpa Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 565, 577, 587-8; 
Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41, 81, 96-7, 116, 150; John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v 
Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 533 [64]; Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission 
(2006) 226 CLR 362, 403-4 [35]. 
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position should not differ between those two categories, considering the 
close relationship between the Australian jurisdictions and the ability 
of Australian residents to move freely throughout Australia. 
A. D omestic Altruistic Surrogacy 
Altruistic surrogacy occurring in Australia is not criminalised, and the 
intended parents’ promise to reimburse the surrogate mother’s 
reasonable expenses is enforceable (although there is some variation 
among the jurisdictions as to the items of expenses that can be 
reimbursed). Any public policy concern can only come from the 
regulation of legal parentage. 
Legislation in each Australian jurisdiction provides that a woman 
who has become pregnant through a fertilisation procedure (which is 
the case for a surrogate mother) is a legal parent of the child at the time 
of birth, and so is her partner if the partner consented to the procedure.67 
It is irrelevant whether the woman or her partner is a genetic parent of 
the child. A genetic parent who is not the birth mother or her partner is 
not a legal parent at the time of birth. These provisions were enacted for 
cases in which the birth mother is also the intended mother, but the 
provisions have been retained in the context of surrogacy to preserve 
the surrogate mother’s right to change her mind about relinquishing the 
child to the intended parents.68 
The Northern Territory does not have any legislation under which 
the intended parents can become the legal parents of the child (other 
than through adoption). However, the legislature’s failure to actively 
facilitate surrogacy arrangements does not by itself indicate an intention 
to deter such arrangements. The law of the Northern Territory does not 
have a public policy against domestic altruistic surrogacy. 
Statutes in the other jurisdictions enable the intended parents in 
cases of altruistic69 surrogacy to obtain a parentage order transferring 
 
67  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT s 11; Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) s 14; Status of Children 
Act 1978 (NT) ss 5C-5F; Status of Children Act 1978 (Qld) ss 17-19; Family Relationships 
Act 1975 (SA) s 10C; Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas) s 10C; Status of Children Act 1974 
(Vic) ss 10C-10E; Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) ss 5-7; See Re Michael (Surrogacy 
Arrangements) (2009) 41 Fam LR 694. 
68  NSW Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Legislation on Altruistic 
Surrogacy in NSW (2009) [6.146]. The position is supported by Jenni Millbank, ‘Rethinking 
“Commercial” Surrogacy in Australia’ (2015) 12(3) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 477, 485-
6. Other commentators prefer a surrogacy model under which the intended parents are the 
legal parents from birth; see, eg, Kirsty Horsey, ‘Challenging Presumptions: Legal 
Parenthood and Surrogacy Arrangements’ (2010) 22(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 
449; Liezl van Zyl and Ruth Walker, ‘Surrogacy, Compensation, and Legal Parentage: 
Against the Adoption Model’ (2015) 12(3) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 383. 
69  Taken literally, s 18 of the Surrogacy Act 2019 (SA) permits parentage orders for 
commercial as well as altruistic surrogacies, as it only requires the presence of a ‘lawful 
surrogacy arrangement’ and the requirements of a ‘lawful surrogacy arrangement’ set out in 
s 10 do not include the absence of a promise to pay a fee. However, such a promise is 
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legal parenthood from the surrogate mother (and her partner where 
applicable) to the intended parents.70 The application for the parentage 
order must be made within six months71 of the birth of the child and the 
making of the parentage order must be in the best interests of the child. 
There are further requirements in relation to matters such as the age, 
residence and/or citizenship of the surrogate mother or the provision of 
counselling, which vary considerably between the jurisdictions.72 
It may be difficult to decide whether the interests protected by these 
further conditions are sufficiently strong to indicate a public policy 
against the compensation of the cost of a surrogacy arrangement that 
does not comply with the conditions. But this question need not be 
pursued. It is difficult to imagine that a plaintiff will reveal to the court 
an intention to enter into a domestic altruistic surrogacy arrangement in 
violation of the regulatory requirements. If a plaintiff does reveal such 
an intention, compensation should be denied on the ground that the 
surrogacy arrangement intended by the plaintiff is not a reasonable 
measure to address her infertility. 
In conclusion, public policy will rarely (if ever) bar compensation 
of the cost of a domestic altruistic surrogacy arrangement. 
B. International Altruistic Surrogacy 
Where the plaintiff lives in a foreign country and intends to enter into 
an altruistic surrogacy arrangement there, no Australian jurisdiction can 
have a public policy against the compensation of the cost of the 
arrangement, although any criminalisation of the arrangement by the 
foreign law would prevent the arrangement from constituting a 
reasonable measure to address the plaintiff’s infertility.73 
Where the plaintiff lives in Australia and intends to enter into an 
altruistic surrogacy arrangement in a foreign country (in which such an 
arrangement is lawful), there is neither actual nor hypothetical 
criminality under the law of any Australian jurisdiction,74 and the laws 
of all Australian jurisdictions enforce in principle the plaintiff’s 
 
unenforceable (s 11) and the entering into a commercial surrogacy arrangement is a criminal 
offence (s 23). The legislature seems to have taken the view that parentage orders are 
confined to altruistic surrogacies; see South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Assembly, 1 August 2019, 6967-8 (Vickie Chapman, Deputy Premier and Attorney- 
General). 
70  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) ss 24-26; Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) ss 14-38; Surrogacy Act 
2010 (Qld) ss 21-23; Surrogacy Act 2019 (SA) ss 10, 18; Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) ss 14-
16; Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) ss 20-24; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 13-22. Federal 
law recognises a parentage order made under state or territory law: Family Law Act 1975 
(Cth) s 60HB. 
71  It is 12 months in South Australia: Surrogacy Act 2019 (SA) s 18(2)(a). 
72  The requirements in the various jurisdictions are discussed by Jenni Millbank, ‘The New 
Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia: Cautious Regulation or “25 Brick Walls”?’ (2011) 
35(1) Melbourne University Law Review 165, 178-85. 
73  See above, Part IV(A). 
74  For the meaning of actual criminality and hypothetical criminality, see above, Part IV. 
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promise to pay the surrogate mother’s expenses. Any public policy 
against the compensation of the cost of the surrogacy arrangement can 
only be derived from the regulation of legal parentage of the child. 
Intended parents living in Australia are not generally able to be 
recognised as the child’s legal parents in cases of international 
surrogacy (leaving aside adoption).75 This is because Australian courts 
usually apply Australian law (the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
intended parents reside) to determine legal parentage. 76  Under 
Australian law, the intended parents are not the legal parents of the child 
at birth. 77  The law of the Northern Territory does not provide for 
parentage orders. The laws of the other jurisdictions do provide for 
parentage orders in cases of altruistic surrogacy, but only if at least one 
of the following is present: the surrogate mother lives in the 
jurisdiction, 78  the fertilisation procedure is carried out in the 
jurisdiction, 79  the surrogate mother is an Australian citizen or 
permanent resident,80 the counselling is provided by a counsellor who 
has been accredited in the jurisdiction 81  or is the member of an 
Australian association,82 or legal advice is provided by an Australian 
practitioner. 83  These requirements are not satisfied in cases of 
international surrogacy. However, the inability of Australian residents 
to become the legal parents of the child in cases of international 
altruistic surrogacy is the result simply of the courts and legislatures 
failing to actively facilitate international altruistic surrogacy rather than 
their conscious decision to prevent it. There is no public policy against 
the compensation of the cost of an international altruistic surrogacy 
arrangement. 
C. D omestic Commercial Surrogacy 
In the case of commercial surrogacy carried out in Australia, the laws 
of all Australian jurisdictions refuse to recognise the intended parents 
 
75  Mary Keyes, ‘Surrogacy in Australia’ in Jens M Scherpe, Claire Fenton-Glynn and Terry 
Kaan (eds), Eastern and Western Perspectives on Surrogacy (Intersentia, 2019) 83, 101. For 
a criticism of this position and a suggestion for reform, see Jenni Millbank, ‘Resolving the 
Dilemma of Legal Parentage for Australians Engaged in International Surrogacy’ (2013) 
27(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 135. 
76  See, eg, Gough v Kaur [2012] FamCA 79, [7]. The absence of a proper choice-of-law 
exercise is criticised by Mary Keyes and Richard Chisholm, ‘Commercial Surrogacy – Some 
Troubling Family Law Issues’ (2013) 27(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 105, 120. 
77  See above, Section A. 
78  Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 16(2)(g). If this requirement is not satisfied, the court can still 
make a parentage order if this is in the best interests of the child: Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 
16(3). 
79  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(a); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) s 20(1)(a). 
80  Surrogacy Act 2019 (SA) s 10(3)(c). 
81  Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 47; Surrogacy Regulations 2019 (WA) s 3. 
82  Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 19. 
83  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 36. 
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as the legal parents of the child and render the intended parents’ promise 
of a fee (in addition to the reimbursement of expenses) unenforceable. 
In the law of the Northern Territory, the position as to parentage is 
simply the result of the legislature’s failure to legislate on surrogacy, 
and the unenforceability of the intended parents’ promise of a fee is the 
position that the common law is assumed to take. The legislature has 
not enacted any legislation criminalising commercial surrogacy or 
indeed disfavouring it in any other way. It is difficult to find a clear 
public policy of the Northern Territory’s legal system against the 
compensation of the cost of a domestic commercial surrogacy 
arrangement apart from cases where the law of another jurisdiction 
imposes criminal liability.84 
In the laws of the other Australian jurisdictions, the denial of legal 
parentage and the unenforceability of the intended parents’ promise of 
a fee are both found in legislation. The legislatures have thus made a 
conscious decision to disfavour domestic commercial surrogacy. 
Indeed, they have criminalised it. This should give rise to a public 
policy against the compensation of the cost of a domestic commercial 
surrogacy arrangement. 
D. International Commercial Surrogacy 
The type of surrogacy which is most likely to arise in Australian 
personal injury litigation but for which it is most difficult to determine 
the public policy position is that of commercial surrogacy carried out in 
a foreign country in which it is lawful. 
The law of the Northern Territory does not bar compensation for the 
cost of such an arrangement on public policy grounds, apart from cases 
where the law of another jurisdiction imposes criminal liability.85 
It is more difficult to determine the public policy position under the 
laws of the other Australian jurisdiction. Those laws have a public 
policy against commercial surrogacy carried out in Australia.86 It does 
not necessarily follow that they also have a public policy against 
commercial surrogacy carried out overseas. No legal system can expect 
all other legal systems to make exactly the same public policy choices 
that it has made. However, there may be interests that a legal system 
regards as so fundamental that it protects them even if the relevant event 
occurs in another jurisdiction. 
The criminalisation of commercial surrogacy, bolstered by the non-
enforceability of the promise of a fee and the denial of legal parentage 
to the intended parents, indicates that the protected interests (to prevent 
the commercialisation of children and the exploitation of vulnerable 
 
84  See above, Part IV(A). 
85  See above, Parts IV(A) and V(C). 
86  See above, Part V(C). 
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women) are regarded as fundamental. The question arises whether these 
interests are regarded as in need of protection regardless of where in the 
world the commercial surrogacy arrangement is carried out. The answer 
to this question is not obvious and may depend upon whether the child 
is intended to live in Australia. 
Where the plaintiff lives in the foreign country and the child is 
intended to live there, the surrogacy arrangement does not affect 
Australia and the Australian jurisdictions should accept the policy 
decision that the foreign legal system has made in relation to 
commercial surrogacy. It is noteworthy that intended parents who lived 
overseas during the surrogacy arrangement and obtained a foreign court 
order that declares them to be the legal parents of the child may have 
that order recognised in Australia; public policy does not generally bar 
such recognition even in cases of (lawful) commercial surrogacy.87 Nor 
should public policy bar compensation for the cost of a surrogacy 
arrangement in those circumstances. 
The position is more difficult where the plaintiff lives in Australia 
and intends to bring the child to Australia. In those circumstances, 
neither the fertilisation procedure nor the surrogate mother’s pregnancy 
would affect Australia. It could be argued that Australian law should 
not seek to protect a surrogate mother who lives overseas. On the other 
hand, the surrogacy arrangement would affect Australia, as the child is 
intended to live in Australia and the circumstances of the child’s birth 
would become known to the community in which the child would live. 
This factor is more significant as the child is the centre of a surrogacy 
arrangement. On balance, compensation of the cost of the surrogacy 
arrangement should be barred on public policy grounds. 
The view advanced here differs from the view taken for English law 
by the majority of the UK Supreme Court in XX v Whittington Hospital 
NHS Trust.88 The majority held that English law did not have a public 
policy against the award of damages for the cost of a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement that an English resident intended to enter into in 
California.89 Two key reasons for the majority’s view were the fact that 
neither the plaintiff nor the surrogate mother would have been 
 
87  Re Grosvenor [2017] FamCA 366, [31]-[32]; Sigley v Sigley (2018) 57 Fam LR 347, [32]-
[33]. See also Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69S(1A) and Family Law Regulations 1984 
(Cth) sch 4, 4A: a person is presumed to be the parent of a child if a court in a prescribed 
country has so found. But none of the prescribed countries is a commercial surrogacy 
destination for Australian residents. Being named as a parent on the child’s foreign birth 
certificate raises no presumption of parentage under Australian law: Ellison v Karnchanit 
(2012) 48 Fam LR 33, [70]. 
88  XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14), overturning Briody v St Helens and Knowsley Area 
Health Authority [2002] QB 856; See also Wilhelmson v Dumma (2017) 96 BCLR (5th) 
120 [374]. 
89  For a different view, see Amel Alghrani and Craig Purshouse, ‘Damages for Reproductive 
Negligence: Commercial Surrogacy on the NHS?’ (2019) 135 (July) Law Quarterly Review 
405, 410. 
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criminally liable even if the arrangement had taken place in England,90 
and the fact that the plaintiff (and her partner) would be able to obtain 
a parental order (transferring parentage) from an English court.91 This 
differs from the position in the Australian jurisdictions under 
discussion, where domestic commercial surrogacy is criminalised and 
parentage orders are not possible in cases of international commercial 
surrogacy.92 
In conclusion, where the plaintiff intends to enter into a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement carried out in a foreign country in which it is 
lawful, public policy bars compensation of the cost of the arrangement 
if the lex loci delicti criminalises commercial surrogacy and the child is 
intended to live in Australia.93 
VI Other Issues 
Where the cost of a surrogacy arrangement is in principle recoverable, 
there are still some other issues that may arise. These will now be 
discussed. 
A. F ailure to M itigate Loss through Adoption 
The victim of a tort or breach of contract may not recover damages for 
loss that could have been avoided by taking reasonable measures.94 A 
defendant might argue that the plaintiff could avoid the cost of a 
surrogacy arrangement by adopting a child. Such an argument would 
not succeed. A surrogacy arrangement enables the plaintiff to raise a 
child from the age of about six months, which is the best possible 
substitute for the plaintiff’s lost ability to carry a child and raise the 
child from birth. For adoption to provide a similar benefit, the plaintiff 
(and her partner) will have to adopt an infant, which will rarely be 
 
90  XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14), 980 [19], [21]. 
91  XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14), 978-9 [16], where Baroness Hale observed that parental 
orders are routinely granted in cases of commercial surrogacy, as English courts give 
preference to the welfare of the child and retrospectively authorise the payment of a fee; see 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK) ss 54(8), 54A(7). See, eg, Re C 
(Parental Order) [2014] 1 FLR 757. 
92  Dudley v Chedi [2011] FamCA 502, [28]-[32]. This does not seem to deter Australians from 
engaging in international commercial surrogacy: Jackson et al (n 26), 46. New federal 
legislation permitting (under conditions) parentage orders in cases of international 
commercial surrogacy has been recommended by the Family Law Council, Report on 
Parentage and the Family Law Act (2013) ch 3. See also Anita Stuhmcke, ‘New Wine in 
Old Bottles and Old Wine in New Bottles: The Judicial Response to International 
Commercial Surrogacy in the United Kingdom and Australia’ in Kirsty Horsey (ed), 
Revisiting the Regulation of Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge, 2015) 200. 
93  If the cost of an Australian resident entering into a commercial surrogacy arrangement 
overseas is not considered irrecoverable on this ground, there will still be the question of 
whether the cost (including the cost of multiple travels to the foreign country) is reasonable 
in the circumstances; see XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14) 988 [53]. 
94  Eg, Tuncel v Renown Plate Co Pty Ltd [1976] VR 501, 503–4; Arnott v Choy (2010) 56 
MVR 390, 422 [155]; Powercor Australia Ltd v Thomas (2012) 43 VR 220, [52]–[53]. 
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possible. Even if the adoption of an infant is practically possible, the 
process is complex and can be lengthy, and the cost may not be 
significantly lower than the cost of a surrogacy arrangement. The 
plaintiff’s preference for a surrogacy arrangement rather than adoption 
cannot be regarded as unreasonable. 
B. D eduction of Saved Expenditure on Plaintiff’s  
Pregnancy 
If the cost of a surrogacy arrangement is recoverable, there must be a 
deduction of the amount of expenses that the plaintiff would have 
incurred had she carried a child herself.95 This follows from the general 
principle that expenses that an injured person saves by reason of the 
injury must be deducted from the financial loss caused by the injury, at 
least where there is a correlation between the loss and the saved 
expenses.96 This does not necessarily, or even usually, rule out damages 
for the cost of an altruistic surrogacy arrangement, as the expenses 
incurred by the surrogate mother may well be higher than the cost that 
a pregnancy of the plaintiff would have generated. In particular, the 
surrogate mother’s pregnancy requires artificial insemination. It is also 
possible that the surrogate mother undergoes medical tests more 
frequently than the plaintiff would have done or uses more expensive 
medical services. 
C. The Effect of U ncertainty 
1 U ncertainty as to the Plaintiff’s F uture D ecision 
It may be uncertain whether the plaintiff will actually enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement. 
In cases of personal injury, damages will not be awarded for the cost 
of a measure where the chance of that measure being carried out is so 
low as to be regarded as speculative.97 Where the chance is between 1 
and 99%, the uncertainty will not be resolved on the balance of 
probabilities, but the court will make an award proportionate to the 
degree of probability of the measure being carried out.98 These rules 
 
95  Such a deduction was not made in XX v Whittington NHS Hospital Trust [2018] PIQR Q2, 
[53]. No explanation was given. A likely explanation is that the claimant, had she been 
pregnant, would have made use of the free services of the UK’s National Health Service. 
96  See Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94 (an injured person whose life expectation has been 
shortened by the injury may recover damages for the loss of earnings in the ‘lost years’, but 
the saved cost of maintaining the injured person during the ‘lost years’ must be deducted); 
Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, 577 (the calculation of loss of earning capacity must 
involve a deduction of expenses that would have been necessary to exercise the earning 
capacity, such as cost of special clothing or transportation to and from work). 
97  Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, 643. See, eg, Potts v Frost (2011) 59 MVR 
267 321 [252]. 
98  Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, 642-3. 
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apply not only to medical treatment99 but also to other measures such 
as the modification of the home of a disabled plaintiff.100 They must 
also apply to the cost of a surrogacy arrangement. Thus, no damages 
should be awarded where the chance of the plaintiff entering into a 
surrogacy arrangement is so low as to be speculative.101 Otherwise, a 
proportionate award will be made. For example, where there is a 25% 
chance that the plaintiff will enter into a particular surrogacy 
arrangement, the court will award 25% of the cost of that arrangement. 
Any deduction to reflect the possibility that the plaintiff will not 
enter into a surrogacy arrangement should be made before the deduction 
of the expenses the plaintiff has saved by not carrying a child herself, 
as it is certain that the plaintiff has saved those expenses.102  
2 U ncertainty as to the Birth of a Child 
It may be certain that the plaintiff will enter into a surrogacy 
arrangement, but uncertain whether such an arrangement will result in 
the birth of a child. In particular, it may be uncertain, in the light of the 
age and health of the plaintiff and her partner, whether a fertilisation 
procedure will be successful. The amount of damages cannot be 
reduced to reflect the possibility of the surrogacy arrangement not 
resulting in the birth of a child, because the plaintiff will incur the entire 
cost either way. However, if the probability of the surrogacy 
arrangement resulting in the birth of a child is very low, damages for 
the cost of the arrangement may be denied altogether on the ground that 
the entering into such an arrangement is not a necessary and reasonable 
measure to address the effects of the plaintiff’s infertility.103 
 
99  Eg Amoud v Al Batat (2009) 54 MVR 167, 167-8 [2], 173 [35]; Avopiling Pty Ltd v 
Bosevski (2018) 98 NSWLR 171 [166]-[169]. For fertility treatment, see Potts v Frost 
(2011) 59 MVR 267, 321-2 [253]-[255]. 
100  Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162, 176. 
101  See Hornberg v Horrobin [1998] QCA 283, where Demack J (dissenting) rejected the claim 
for the cost of employing a nanny to care for future children to be acquired through adoption 
or surrogacy, on the ground that the plaintiff’s severe injuries made it unlikely for her ever 
to have children; the majority in the court rejected liability and did not discuss the 
assessment of damages. For Canadian law, see Sadlowski v Yeung (2008) 166 ACWS (3d) 
177, [133]. 
102  Where it is uncertain that the plaintiff would have had a particular number of children in the 
absence of the defendant’s wrong, a deduction must be made to reflect this uncertainty. This 
deduction must be made after the deduction of the expenses the plaintiff has saved by not 
carrying a child herself, as both loss and saved expenditure are subject to the same degree of 
uncertainty. 
103  Damages were denied in Briody v St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority [2002] 
QB 856, 866-7 [22], where the chance of success was 1%. This aspect of Briody was not 
overruled in XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14); see XX v Whittington Hospital (n 14) 986 
[44], 987 [48]. 
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D. Infertility as an Aspect of N on-Pecuniary Loss 
Loss of fertility is the loss of an amenity and will generally be reflected 
in the award for non-pecuniary loss.104 As Hale LJ has said: ‘In the case 
of a woman who has always wanted children, to be deprived forever of 
the chance of having and bringing up those children is a very serious 
loss of amenity quire separate from the pain and suffering caused by the 
injury’.105 If the cost of a surrogacy arrangement is fully compensated, 
the plaintiff’s infertility should not be a major aspect of the award for 
non-pecuniary loss, as the plaintiff is given the money to have a child 
or children through surrogacy and thus avoid (most of) the non-
pecuniary loss that would otherwise flow from her infertility. 
If there is uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff will actually avoid 
the non-pecuniary consequences of her infertility through a surrogacy 
arrangement, a proportionate award should be made. The award should 
reflect any uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff will enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement and whether the arrangement will result in the 
birth of a child.106 For example, if there is a 50% chance of the plaintiff 
entering into a surrogacy arrangement and a 50% chance of such an 
arrangement resulting in the birth of a child, there should (in addition 
to an award of half of the cost of the surrogacy arrangement) be an 
award of 75% of the (additional) amount that would be awarded for the 
non-pecuniary consequences of the plaintiff’s infertility if no damages 
were awarded for the cost of the surrogacy arrangement.107 
VII Conclusion 
A claim for the cost of a surrogacy arrangement in Australian personal 
injury litigation would raise a number of issues under Australian law. 
The surrogacy arrangement must be an adequate substitute for the 
plaintiff’s lost ability to carry a child herself and must be a necessary 
and reasonable measure to address the effects of her infertility. This 
should not require the plaintiff to be a genetic or legal parent of the child 
born under the surrogacy arrangement. 
There are three grounds that should bar compensation of the cost of 
a surrogacy arrangement depending on the circumstances. First, to the 
extent to which a statute of the locus delicti proscribes the enforcement 
of the plaintiff’s promise to make a payment to the surrogate mother, 
coherence of the law (as understood by the High Court in Miller v 
Miller) requires the denial of compensation of the plaintiff’s cost. 
 
104  Bulpitt v Gough (Supreme Court of South Australia, Full Court, Matheson, Olsson and 
Duggan JJ, 28 March 1991); Namala v Northern Territory of Australia (1996) 131 FLR 468. 
For Canadian law, see Sadlowski v Yeung (2008) 166 ACWS (3d) 177, [130]-[131]. 
105  Briody v St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority [2002] QB 856, 865-6 [18]. 
106  See, for English law, XX v Whittington Hospital NHS Trust [2019] 3 WLR 107, 137 [113]. 
107  For the combination of multiple uncertain events, see Heenan v Di Sisto (2008) Aust Torts 
Reports 81–941, [50]. 
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Secondly, a surrogacy arrangement that involves criminal activity 
should not be regarded as a necessary and reasonable measure, whoever 
is the person committing the offence and whichever jurisdiction 
imposes the criminal liability. Finally, compensation of the plaintiff’s 
cost should be denied by direct reference to public policy where the 
child is intended to live in Australia and the lex loci delicti criminalises 
the type of surrogacy arrangement intended by the plaintiff. 
None of these grounds excludes compensation for the cost of an 
altruistic surrogacy arrangement, whether domestic or international. 
The first two grounds mentioned exclude compensation for the 
plaintiff’s cost in almost all cases of domestic surrogacy.108 
In a case of international commercial surrogacy, the plaintiff’s cost 
can be compensated only if the plaintiff does not reside in the Australian 
Capital Territory, New South Wales or Queensland (as the criminal 
prohibitions of those jurisdictions have extraterritorial effect), and 
either the Northern Territory is the locus delicti or the child is not 
intended to live in Australia. 
The position is thus complex, reflecting the differences among the 
Australian jurisdictions in respect of the regulation of surrogacy. A 
uniform regulation of surrogacy throughout Australia is desirable and 
would remove some of the complexities of the question of whether the 
cost of a surrogacy arrangement can be compensated in personal injury 
litigation. However, as long as commercial surrogacy remains 
criminalised in Australia, the question of whether public policy bars 
compensation for the cost of an international commercial surrogacy 
arrangement will remain a disputed issue, unless legislation sets out the 
circumstances in which the cost of a surrogacy arrangement is 
compensable. 
 
108  Compensation may not be barred where the Northern Territory is both the locus delicti and 
the place where the surrogacy arrangement is carried out, and the plaintiff does not reside in 
the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales or Queensland. 
